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ABSTRACT 
As is arguably common knowledge among defense procurement professionals, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions process is slow, expensive, and inefficient. 
Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted DoD Weapons 
Systems Acquisition and Supply Chain Management as two high-risk areas requiring 
focused effort to meet cost, schedule and performance goals. Blockchain technology has 
the potential to advance these goals. Congress agrees. By transforming how we conduct 
business, the DoD can realize significant benefits from blockchain technology. Private 
industry is testing blockchain and offers an opportunity for the DoD to learn from 
established practices. This research centers on how industry is implementing blockchain 
technology and leads to illustrate parallels where the DoD can apply similar practices to 
achieve efficiencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain technology has garnered widespread attention spanning from 
congressional politicians to computer technology hobbyists. Some authors suggest that 
blockchain will eventually improve nearly every transaction in the economy (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016), while others caution society to have realistic expectations of the benefits 
(Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017; Johansen, 2017). Regardless, one common theme emerges across 
the literature: Businesses and consumers must pay attention to the technology and 
understand that it is likely to fundamentally alter the way our world works (Jaikaran, 2018; 
Joint Economic Committee, 2018; Morris, Mirkovic, & O’Rourke, 2018). Just as the 
internet has changed the way we interact, shop, and learn, blockchain can change the way 
we do business, verify information, and create trust in interactions with unfamiliar people.    
The key aspects of blockchain technology that provide demonstrable benefits are 
the distributed ledger and cryptographic hashing process (Sharma, 2018; Stevens, 2018). 
Distributed ledgers are present in our current environment, but they lack the security 
functions required for sensitive transitions (Drescher, 2017). However, when distributed 
ledgers are coupled with a consensus protocol using cryptographic hashing, this creates a 
secure, efficient, and convenient method for transacting with others (Zheng, Xie, Dai, 
Chen, & Wang, 2017). This new way of transacting can address issues witnessed in private 
procurement sectors. Companies are currently investing in blockchain technology to solve 
issues.   
While differences exist between public and private procurement, similarities also 
exist, such as the need for auditability, reducing duplicative verifications, and providing 
transparency and traceability. Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has consistently highlighted weapons systems acquisitions and supply chain management 
as two high-risk areas requiring effort to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals 
(GAO, 2017a). Efforts are underway by some federal agencies in utilizing blockchain 
technology to improve their unique difficulties. However, the current research fails to 
bridge the gap between blockchain technology and the public procurement process within 
the DoD.   
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The purpose of this research is to take an in-depth look at the way industry has 
applied this emerging technology to improve various procurement functions, and to gauge 
whether specific use cases exist for DoD acquisitions. We aimed to do this with an analysis 
of specifically selected case studies in which private companies use blockchain technology 
to solve issues comparable to those of the DoD. Our analysis revealed common elements 
during the successful implementation of blockchain within the private companies. After 
performing the case study analysis, we discuss the findings and determine what elements 
appear to be relevant and potentially significant to the DoD and public procurement sector. 
Furthermore, we include a list of recommendations based on the trends identified during 
data analysis.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. BLOCKCHAIN  
As the enabling technology behind various cryptocurrencies, the interest in 
blockchain technology grew as a result of the drastic rise and fall in Bitcoin’s valuation in 
2017. Research shows that blockchain technology is a solution to issues such as 
cybersecurity and transaction processing found within various industries like finance, 
healthcare, insurance, and supply chain management without the oversight of a third-party 
organization (Ponemon Institute, 2017; Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, & Smolander, 2016).  
Blockchain is a technology that can fundamentally change the way we track and 
record transactions, information, and assets. The interworking of the technical aspects of 
blockchain are not vital to our discussion. Many people enjoy the benefits of a microwave, 
a cell phone, or the internet without a technical understanding of the micro-level operations 
that allow those technologies to exist (Drescher, 2017). In this chapter, we provide a 
high-level of explanation on the most vital elements of the technology for decision makers 
and users.  
The basis of blockchain technology is a distributed ledger that is validated and 
secured through a network of peers (Sharma, 2018). (Note: In the following sections, we 
will define and discuss the technical terms we use in this brief overview.) Transactions 
become part of the blockchain after they are confirmed mathematically by the computers, 
or nodes, working on the blockchain platform (Sharma, 2018). Specific consensus 
protocols outline which, or how many, nodes must confirm the transaction prior to system 
acceptance (Berke, 2017). Each transaction is cryptographically hashed and contains the 
hashes of prior blocks plus the new information (Cachin & Vukolic, 2017). The most recent 
hash is a unique string of numbers and letters which is easy to verify, once solved by the 
computer, but computationally improbable to reverse engineered or duplicate (Berke, 
2017; Peters & Panayi, 2016). Any changes in the prior verified transactions on the 
blockchain creates an error in the hash that the platform will not accept (Cachin & Vukolic, 
2017). This unique quality creates an immutable ledger that cannot be tampered with or 
unknowingly altered without setting off red flags.   
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1. Key Aspects 
The decentralized, distributed ledger and the cryptographic hashing process are two 
of the key aspects that make blockchain technology so powerful (Sharma, 2018). The 
distributed ledger and hashing process (Stevens, 2018) have existed for many years. Haber 
and Stornetta (1991) linked the concepts over 20 years ago in their research related to time-
stamping documents. However, with the release of the Bitcoin whitepaper in 2009 
(Nakamoto, 2008), which has been cited over 4,000 times on Google Scholar, and with the 
2016 boom in the cryptocurrency space as measured by an influx of millions of active 
digital cryptocurrency wallets (Hileman & Rauchs, 2017), the power of blockchain 
technology emerges as an area of great potential. While we must be realistic about 
the advantages of blockchain, multiple potential applications for the technology exist in 
the government which will facilitate auditability, streamlined processes, and transparency 
and traceability.   
a. Distributed Ledger  
The concept of a ledger, or list, has existed for over 5,000 years (Schmandt-
Besserat, 2014). It can contain transactions, names, book titles, contract clauses, or any 
number of other things. A distributed ledger is a list maintained by multiple users and not 
housed in a single, central location. If a person wrote a list of three names and provided a 
copy of that list to two other individuals, that list would essentially be distributed. If a name 
should be added to the ledger, the three parties would communicate, and all three people 
would update their ledgers to add the new name. This is the basis of distributed ledger 
technology—a digital form of the previous example.   
Distributed ledgers are present in our current business environment. The Google 
docs application provides distributed documents, where multiple users can edit a document 
simultaneously, and updates made by one user are visible to all users. However, the 
distributed ledger technology of Google Docs lacks security functions required for  
financial, business, and other sensitive transactions (Drescher, 2017). Understandably, 
financial institutions do not maintain banking records on a Google Doc. Instead, and to 
“manufacture” a layer of trust, transacting parties rely on intermediaries such as banks, 
clearinghouses, and lawyers to maintain a centralized ledger (Casey & Vigna, 2018). 
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Transacting parties transfer trust from each other to regulated intermediaries. Society 
consider these intermediaries as unbiased third parties. Unfortunately, security issues are 
not eliminated with centralized systems. Evidence of residual vulnerabilities is exposed in 
media headlines on a daily basis.  
While centralized systems were created to transfer trust, they are costly, timely, and 
vulnerable to attacks (Drescher, 2017). Additionally, housing a firm’s data on servers at a 
single location puts that data at risk of loss from physical disasters such as fire, flood, or 
natural disaster. As our economy becomes more and more digital, cyber security attacks 
happen with greater frequency (Ponemon Institute, 2017). Companies are spending 
millions of dollars on protecting personal information, and hackers still gain access and 
compromise many customers’ data. In an eight-year study (Ponemon Institute, 2017), 
researchers found a 27.4 percent net increase in the average number of security breaches 
per year over eight years. Additionally, the cost of these attacks is rising each year and 
accelerates past $11 million on average for a large company of 1,000 people or more 
(Ponemon Institute, 2017). To combat these attacks, companies make investments to deter 
and detect incidents, which lead to redundancies and permissioned systems which lack 
transparency. 
However, with blockchain, the ledger is not housed in a single location with an 
intermediary company; it exists on each computer operating on the network. This 
eliminates the single location issue that is susceptible to physical compromise and reliance 
on third parties to maintain the security of one’s personally identifiable information or 
sensitive details. The computers running the platform individually maintain a copy of the 
encrypted distributed ledger, so if one computer is damaged, the information is available 
from any number of other computers on the platform. Figure 1 shows the differences 
between a centralized ledger and a distributed ledger. An objector may argue that with 
information distributed to many users, security is a greater concern. However, 
cryptographic hashing is the second vital element of blockchain technology, which 
addresses the security of information originally discussed with the distributed ledger.  
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 Centralized Ledger versus Distributed Ledger. Source: Berlin (n.d.). 
b. Cryptographic Hashing 
Cryptographic hashing works in tandem with the distributed ledger technology to 
create an instantly verifiable and immutable ledger entry (Cheng, Daub, Domeyer, & 
Lundqvist, 2017). Instead of maintaining the exact transaction data, the data is hashed into 
a specified number of alphanumeric characters. The hashing process was developed in the 
1950s to sort and verify information faster (Stevens, 2018). A hashing function begins with 
an input of any size and returns a string of alpha-numeric characters unique to that 
information (Adamchick, 2009). The number of characters in the output is system-specific; 
Bitcoin, for example, uses 256 characters (Asolo, 2018). If the input is “Hello,” the hash 
function returns 256 characters. Any slight change in the input, such as “Hello!” returns a 
completely different string of 256 characters. Carter & Wegman (1977) provide more 
information on the various hashing functions. Hashing is different than encryption. 
Encryption involves both encrypting and decrypting data, while hashing creates a unique 
string of alphanumeric characters of a set length regardless of the amount of data input. For 
example, a phone number, the previous example of “Hello,” and the full text of a long book 
would all be hashed into different strings of exactly 256 characters.   
On a blockchain, each new block contains a hash of the new information, including 
the prior block’s hash. If an attempt is made to alter past transaction information, the 
current hash would become invalid because it is created from the original input (a hash of 
all previous hashes). The invalid hashes are not accepted during the consensus protocol, 
which protects the validity of the information and creates a tamper-resistant and reliable 
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single source of truth (Miles, 2017). Nakamoto (2008) discussed the immense disk space 
that would be required to store the history of each and every transaction. However, by 
leveraging a Merkle tree,1 as show in Figure 2, storage requirements can be drastically 
reduced while maintaining the integrity of the data. In Figure 2, the bottom row of boxes 
labeled Tx0 through Tx3 represent individual transactions, such as “Bob paid Sally 20 
dollars.”  Regardless of the information in the transaction, whether it is a single word or a 
10-page document, the transaction is hashed into the predetermined number of 
alphanumeric characters, represented by Hash0 in Figure 2. From there, Hash0 and Hash1 
are combined and rehashed to create Hash01. In this example, combining Hash01 and 
Hash23 is the final step in the algorithm and becomes the root hash in the block header. 
Only the block header is rehashed with new transaction eliminating the need to store 
interior transactions (Nakamoto, 2008).  
 
 Hashing Process Using Merkle Trees Source: Nakamoto (2008).   
Similar to many current online transactions, blockchain leverages public and 
private keys to encrypt and decode data. The difference, however, is that the encrypted data 
is hashed, making it instantly verifiable but so immensely difficult to recreate that the cost 
of doing so is nearly unmeasurable. While nothing is impossible, reverse-engineering a 
cryptographic hash is computationally improbable (Peters & Panayi, 2016). Peters and 
                                                 
1 For more information on a Merkle tree, see Merkle (1988). 
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Panayi (2016) used the term computationally improbable to mean “that no known 
algorithm can recover the input message from the hash within a time that is polynomially 
related to the size of the input” (p. 4). Plainly, this translates to an extraordinary amount 
of time. 
c. Consensus Protocols 
In the current business environment, interacting parties do not trust those with 
whom they conduct business (Williamson, 1985). In turn, organizations use intermediaries 
such as banks, clearinghouses, and third parties to manage business transactions. However, 
the use of intermediaries affects transaction costs, and transactions costs influence business 
decisions. Transaction costs are so significant that Williamson’s 1985 research on 
transaction cost economics is cited nearly 50,000 times on Google Scholar. With trillions 
of dollars moving through the financial system each day, even a fraction of a percent in 
transaction costs equates to a significant amount of non–value-added spending by millions 
of customers. However, the integrity of each transaction is vital to firms and organizations 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). Without an alternative, entities are at the mercy of the 
intermediaries.   
Blockchain technology does not use intermediaries to verify the accuracy of 
transactions. Instead, it uses consensus protocols to verify information that requires the 
network nodes to solve complex mathematical equations or cryptographic puzzles that can 
quickly confirm cryptographic information (Zheng et al., 2017). Such information would 
be nearly impossible to duplicate (Zheng et al., 2017). Once a transaction is verified by the 
computers operating on the network in accordance with the consensus protocol, the 
information is added to the blockchain and redistributed to the ledgers held by each node 
(Zheng et al., 2017). When combined with distributed ledger technology and cryptographic 
hashing, consensus protocols create a secure, efficient, and convenient method for 
transacting with others (Zheng et al., 2017).  
Importantly, these consensus protocols determine which nodes, or how many 
nodes, must agree on the correctness of information prior to acceptance by the platform. 
Table 1 list some of the common consensus protocols and outlines the pros and cons of 
each. This is not an exhausted list; the specific business problem dictates the use of the 
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appropriate protocol.  “Developing consensus protocols is difficult and should not be taken 
in an ad-hoc manner” (Cachin & Vukolic, 2017, p. 2). 
 Common Consensus Protocols 
 Pros Cons Examples 
Proof-of-Work (PoW) Scalable A Massive energy 
consumption A 
Bitcoin B 




>51% stake C 
Peercoin D 






the need for 
confirmations E 
Susceptible to 
Sybil attacks E 
Hyperledger 
Fabric F 






>51% validators C 
Bitshares G 
 
Adapted from A Vukolic (2015) 
B Nakamoto (2008) 
C Zheng et al (2017) 
D King & Nadal (2012) 
E Curran (2018) 
F Bitshares.org (2018) 
G Hyperledger.org (2018). 
Some protocols specify that certain individuals, perhaps a warranted contracting 
officer, must validate the transaction prior to the acceptance. This may provide a level of 
control that is appealing to the DoD, whereas platforms like Bitcoin require a percentage 
of users to verify the transaction (Nakamoto, 2008). Regardless, when new blocks are 
hashed, the past information cannot be altered without affecting the hash of all future 
transactions. This ensures data integrity and eliminates the need to redundantly verify 
information; trust is transferred to the technology. If the hash is not valid, an algorithm  
determines that the transaction is invalid and rejects the block or transaction (Zheng et al., 
2017). The platform will not accept this information as trustworthy because the other nodes 
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on the network identify the hash as incongruent with their version of the ledger (Peters & 
Panayi, 2016). 
d. Smart Contracts 
The blockchain can maintain records of self-executing follow-up actions to occur 
after the verification process (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). “If–then” conditions 
introduced on “smart contracts” can automate certain parts of a contractual agreement 
(Zhang & Wen, 2017). A widely used example of a smart contract is to compare it to a 
vending machine. A vending machine is programed with a set of agreements such that 
when the terms are met, an asset is transferred. If the price of water is one dollar, and a 
person inserts one dollar, the water is released.  
On the blockchain, once information is verified, if the transaction occurs as part of 
a smart contract, and the terms of the agreement are met, the transaction automatically 
executes in accordance with the contract. For example, a contracting officer could write a 
contract on a blockchain platform. The computer would turn this into a script in the form 
of “if this, then that” instructions. Once the contract is executed and the parties agree that 
the product is delivered or the services are rendered, the predetermined and agreed upon 
amount transfers to the contractor without any additional effort on behalf of the contracting 
officer or DFAS. Figure 3 shows how this process occurs, leading to lower overhead costs 
and a reduced administrative burden (Marvin, 2016).  
Unlike cryptocurrencies, which use an open blockchain, on a permissioned 
blockchain (shown in Figure 3), only specifically identified users are authorized to create 
or view transactions on the blockchain. A permissioned blockchain still hashes, encrypts 
data, and uses a decentralized ledger, but permissions may be more acceptable for 
transactions the government conducts. As discussed in the consensus protocol section of 
this report, there are benefits and drawbacks to each protocol. Determining the 
appropriateness of an open or permissioned blockchain is of equal importance. 
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  Smart Contract Process on a Permissioned Blockchain. 
Source: Marvin (2016). 
2. Current Government Efforts 
Cuomo, Nash, Pureswaran, Thurlow, and Zaharchuck (2017) report that nine out 
of 10 government executives they interviewed listed contracting management, regulatory 
compliance, citizen services, and identity management as the top four areas that would 
benefit most from blockchain technology. Congress is formalizing the exploration of 
potential applications of blockchain technology through regulator direction, and 
governments around the world are eager to find more effective ways to conduct various 
operations from asset tracking to regulatory compliance to identity management.  
a. Domestic Efforts 
Numerous domestic government agencies are evaluating blockchain technology, 
but they may be far behind other nations. Chairman of the United States Commodity  
Futures and Trading Commission (CFTC) J. Christopher Giancarlo spoke during a session 
of the House Committee on Agriculture, stating that the United States is four years behind 
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in the development of blockchain solutions as compared to major world players 
(Examining the Upcoming Agenda, 2018). We highlight two agencies to illustrate the 
various applications U.S. government entities are exploring. Furthermore, Table 1 lists nine 
additional initiatives underway in the United States, according to the state of Illinois, which 
oversees the Illinois Blockchain Initiative (Morris et al., 2018).  
(1) United States Postal Service (USPS) 
In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General for the United States Postal Service 
(USPS) released a report highlighting the possibility for blockchain technology to “disrupt 
services that traditionally require intermediaries” (p. 1) stating four applications for 
primary use: “financial services, identity services, device management, and supply chain 
management” (p. 2).  
(2) Defense Advanced Research and Procurement Agency (DARPA) 
In 2016, Galois and Guardtime Federal announced receipt of a $1.8 million joint 
contract award from the Defense Advanced Research and Procurement Agency (DARPA) 
to “fund a significant effort that aims to advance the state of formal verification tools and 
all blockchain-based integrity monitoring systems” (para. 1). Later, in 2017, Indiana 
Technology and Manufacturing Companies (ITAMCO) announced receipt of a grant from 
DARPA to build a secure and non-hackable messaging platform for use by the military.   
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 List of United States Federal Government Blockchain Initiatives.  
Government Entity Project Name 
Department of the Navy 
Blockchain to Securely Share Additive 
Manufacturing 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Distributed ledger technology in payments, 
learning, and settlement 
General Services Administration 
(GSA) Federal Blockchain Forum 
Department of Energy Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
Health and Human Services (HHS)—
ONC 
Blockchain and Its Emerging Role in 
Healthcare and Health-related Research 
Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS): Science and Technology 
(S&T) Directorate and the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 
Applicability of Blockchain Technology to 
Privacy Respecting Identity Management 
General Services Administration 
(GSA) FAStLane Automation RFQ 
Institute of Museum and Library 
Services 
Investigation of Possible Uses of Blockchain 
Technology by Libraries-Information Centers 
to Support City-Community Goals 
Health and Human Services (HHS)—
ONC Blockchain in Healthcare Code-A-Thon 
 
Adapted from database referenced in Morris et al. (2018). 
 
b. International Efforts 
The international community is arguably leading the way in blockchain technology 
advancements and implementation. The Illinois Blockchain Initiative tracker records eight 
known projects in the works in China. These projects address applications such as 
centrally-issued currency, taxes, and national blockchain strategy. In 2016, China also 
created the Jiangsu Huaxin Blockchain Research Institute, which aims to radically 
transform the world through blockchain (Morris et al., 2018).  
Likewise, in Canada, the government, various state officials, and the Bank of 
Canada have partnered with prominent blockchain authors, Don and Alex Tapscott, to 
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support blockchain development through the Blockchain Research Institute (BRI, 2017). 
With a multi-million-dollar research program and over 70 projects, “the Blockchain 
Research Institute is conducting the definitive study of the impact of blockchain technology 
on business, government and society” (BRI, 2017, p. 1). Friend or foe, the international 
markets are moving forward with blockchain development. 
B. DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The goods and services procured by both public and private sectors do not 
significantly differ. However, public procurement operates under certain constraints that 
govern contracts and the award mechanisms. Private agencies are not held to these same 
constraints, therefore allowing increased flexibility and efficiency advantages (Tadelis, 
2012). Unlike private sector purchasing functions, the government is not driven by profit 
and losses. Instead, according to the FAR, the government acquisition process is driven to 
maintain the public’s trust and fulfillment of public policy objectives, such as achieving 
socioeconomic goals by prioritizing small business utilization for contract award (FAR 
1.102(a)). 
Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted DoD 
Weapons Systems Acquisition and Supply Chain Management as two high-risk areas 
requiring focused effort to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals (GAO, 2017a). In 
addition, the GAO added DoD Contract Management to the high-risk series in 1992. From 
a senior leadership perspective, inefficiencies are also evident. In 2015, Senator John 
McCain asserted, “our broken defense acquisition system is a clear and present danger to 
the national security of the United States” (p. 2). While Senator McCain’s comments may 
be considered an extreme opinion, government procurement professionals experience the 
inefficiencies of government contracting on a daily basis.  
The DoD acquisition process is lengthy and cumbersome. Services must begin by 
requesting funding years in advance of the acquisition. The budget process works in a 
cyclical fashion where requests must be submitted 17 months before the start of the fiscal 
year (Heniff, Lynch, & Tollestrup, 2012). Each service submits its budget to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which reviews the request and sends it back to the service 
for changes. Once the service returns the budget to the OMB, and after the OMB approves, 
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the budget moves through the legislative branch and eventually is delivered to the president 
for signature. While overly simplified for the purpose of this chapter, even this brief 
description suggests that the budget approval process is lengthy and requires many levels 
of coordination.  
Unfortunately, this process rarely happens in accordance with the expected 
timeline. The Pew Research Center (2018) found that Congress has passed all 12 of the 
appropriations necessary to fund the entire government before the end of the fiscal year on 
only four occasions in the last 40 years (Figure 4). The inability of Congress to approve 
the budget in a timely manner is the first of many substantial difficulties in the DoD’s 
acquisition process. 
 
 Percent of Appropriations Passed on Time. Source: Desilver (2018). 
When the budget is approved, it contains specific restrictions regarding how to 
spend funds. Once the requesting unit receives the funding, there is much more to be done. 
Unlike private companies or in one’s household, money must be spent on the product or 
service it was budgeted for, within a specific time, and for an amount not to exceed what 
was allocated for the purchase (31 U.S.C. 1341; “Anti-Deficiency,” 2018). Any changes to 
the purpose, time, or amount must be reviewed and approved by officials outside of the 
local requesting or purchasing unit. This process, known as reprogramming of appropriated 
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funds, comes with its own challenges and extended timelines (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense [Comptroller; OUSD(C)], 2015).  
Moreover, the government must spend the money in accordance with numerous 
laws and statutes. Unlike private sector purchasing functions, the government is not driven 
by profit and losses. Instead, according to the FAR, the government acquisition process is 
driven to maintain the public’s trust and fulfillment of public policy objectives, such as 
achieving socioeconomic goals by prioritizing small business utilization for contract award 
(FAR 1.102(a)). Contracting officers, the personnel legally authorized to obligate the 
government’s money through contracts, are confined by numerous federal laws, regulatory 
policies, DoD directives, and instructions to ensure that federal funds are equitably 
distributed in a way that provides the best value to the government (Wolters Kluwer, n.d.). 
Most of these laws were created to ensure proper stewardship of taxpayer dollars,  
while others exist because someone made an error (unintentionally or otherwise).  
Either way, contracting officers are required to comply, and ensure contractors comply, 
with many specific laws and statutes for even the most straightforward commodity or 
service purchase.  
The number of charts that exist to describe the DoD’s process for procuring various 
items is astounding. Figure 6, as an example, is a commonly used chart in the procurement 
of major programs or weapons systems. Figure 6 is not meant to be read; instead, it is an 
illustration to show the complexity of the acquisition system. The process is highly 
structured, consists of many steps, and leaves little flexibility or room for delays without 
affecting the entire timeline. Before and after award, various substantial reviews require 
days of preparation consisting of practice briefs, documentation edits, and justifications. 
For programs that are significant in cost or impact, the reviews are made by an individual 
of substantial rank. Therefore, the program manager (PM) or program executive officer 
(PEO) may require a local review prior to the official review. 
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 Defense Acquisition Life Cycle Chart. Source: Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) (2018). 
Moreover, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), one of many regulations 
contracting officers are required by law to comply with, is extensive in length and detail. 
Additionally, United States Title Codes, DoD- and service-specific instructions, and 
various other directives steer the actions of an acquisitions team member. Considerable 
consequences loom over signature authorities in the event that he or she diverges from any 
one of the required regulations. In response, duplication of effort and redundant verification 
take place which affects transaction costs, timely procurements, and appropriate technical 
performance.  
C. OUR CONTRIBUTION  
To the best of our knowledge, no one has analyzed the viability of a blockchain 
technology-based solution to address the main concerns of auditability, duplication, and 
traceability and transparency in the public procurement sector. The lack of research in 
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this area creates a gap in the specific use cases of blockchain technology. However, given 
the emergence of the technology and widespread interest across various domains, we aim 
to close this gap by analyzing three commercial firms with similar problems that 
implemented a blockchain solution. From this analysis, we draw conclusions and make 
recommendations as to the appropriateness of applying similar solutions to public sector 
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III. METHOD 
The application of blockchain technology is so new to the industry that collecting 
data proved challenging. Our research began with a structured literature review of 
blockchain technology and current applications in private sector firms. To obtain the most 
current information, we attended the Third Annual Blockchain Conference in Washington, 
DC, where we heard presentations and engaged with government officials, private industry, 
and tech developers on the topic of blockchain. Additionally, we reviewed various 
government reports, Congressional hearings, and reputable news sources to identify the 
main issues in the DoD acquisition process. We selected three prominent issues in the 
procurement process that we deemed addressable by a blockchain platform. Next, we cast 
a wide net and searched the internet for companies that implemented blockchain solutions. 
We down-selected to three companies which used blockchain technology to remedy 
problems that best matched the significant issues identified in the DoD procurement 
process. We analyzed each case to gain an understanding about the firm’s problem, 
solution, and any outcomes.  
A. STRUCTURED LITERATURE REVIEW 
With a potentially infinite search space, we structured a literature review to the 
scope of this paper. Our research is primarily focused on finding applications of 
blockchain-based solutions. Therefore, we bounded our search to find applied material 
within Google Scholar, NPS Archive Calhoun, academic and trade journals, and reputable 
news sources. We searched these sources using variations of primary terms such as 
“blockchain and supply chain,” “blockchain and procurement,” and “blockchain and 
contracting.” Table 3 shows the summary of our search terms.  
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 Summary of Search Terms, Blockchain 
Blockchain Acquisitions Supply Chain 
Department of 
Defense 
block chain  procurement supply DoD 
Distributed 
ledger (DTL) purchasing 
smart 
contract (s) government 
Bitcoin contracting contract (s) Federal agencies 
cryptocurrency  shipping military 
 
During this time, we also attended the Third Annual Blockchain Conference in 
Washington, DC, to hear presentations from various stakeholders on the most recent 
applications and discussions on blockchain technology. The agenda outlining topics and 
presenters is attached the Appendix (Noyes, 2018). 
We conducted a second search to identify the main concerns in the DoD acquisition 
process. The structure of this search was focused on government reports, Congressional 
hearings, and reputable news sources. We used variations of search terms as listed in Table 
4. After collecting data on the issues in the DoD acquisition process, we briefly analyzed 
and arranged the problems into groups based on the primary characteristics of the 
root cause. Because the purpose of our research was to determine the viability of a 
blockchain-based solution to remedy concerns in the DoD acquisition process, we selected 
three main concerns that blockchain technology claims to address: auditability, duplicative 
verification, and traceability and transparency. 
  Summary of Search Terms, Acquisition Issues  
Problem Department of Defense Acquisitions  
issue DoD procurement 
risk government  contracting 
concern federal program management 
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B. CASE STUDY  
Previously published research states the appropriateness of this method due to the 
nature of our topic as an exploration of the linkage between an emergent or transformative 
technology and existing acquisition processes. Yin (1994) states that when answering 
questions such as “why” or “how,” a case study approach is useful. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), a case study approach is  
particularly well suited to new research areas or research areas for which 
existing theory seems inadequate. This type of work is highly 
complementary to incremental theory building from normal science 
research. The former is useful in early stages of research on a topic or when 
a fresh perspective is needed, whilst the latter is useful in later stages of 
knowledge. (pp. 548–549)  
Likewise, MacNealy (1997) and Eisenhardt (1989) state that the purpose of a case is to 
learn about a single, or select few, situations or events. Our research looks at three 
situations to gain a better understanding of the feasibility of applying blockchain 
technology in the DoD acquisition process.  
There are common objections to the validity of using the case study method to 
conduct research. Hamel (1993) explains a number of issues such as a lack of objectivity 
and the microscopic view from looking at only a few cases. While we acknowledge the 
limited number of cases available for use in this research, we also apply a rigid research 
method governed by MacNealy (1997). Our case selection method is intentional and seeks 
to find examples that most likely reveal how blockchain is useful and where industry has 
proven the implementation of such protocols as supported by Eisenhardt (1989), Siggelkow 
(2007), and Flyvbjerg (2006). With this technology still in its infancy, findings on this 
technology are advancing at rapid speeds, and we will not be able to capture them all in 
this report. Additionally, the method of research does not address the development of the 
technology. Our research is focused on the benefits after implementation. While some 
scholars find objections to the case study method, significant research supports the use of 
it in this instance. And, as Walton (1992) stated, “case studies are likely to produce the best 
theory” (p. 192). 
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At the onset of our research, we conducted an extensive search online for 
blockchain in industry and found few results that did not involve cryptocurrency. However, 
in the last quarter of 2017 through the first quarter of 2018 when the price of Bitcoin surged 
and crashed, attention turned to the technology behind the currency—blockchain. In 
October 2017, Pham reported in a Bloomberg article that there was so much interest in 
blockchain technology and its promising benefits that simply adding “blockchain” to a 
company’s name could increase the value of a firm’s shares. Overstock.com saw similar 
results in their shares after announcing their blockchain interest (Cheng, 2017). 
Simultaneously, our search results began returning a number of companies who publicly 
announced their investment in blockchain.   
We searched various terms including “blockchain technology,” ‘blockchain supply 
chain,” and “blockchain traceability.” We found the following companies (listed in Table 
4) and noted the main problem blockchain solved for the firm. We scrutinized these sources 
to determine whether adequate information existed about the problem and solution 
implementation process. Our selection method was intentional (Patton, 2015), and an 
assortment of different cases may lead to a different result. However, in the case study 
approach, exploratory analyses are appropriate (Siggelkow, 2007).  
 Blockchain Case Selection and Main Issue 
Company  Problem  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG 
Auditability  
IBM and Maersk  Reduced duplication of 
paperwork, increased speed of 
shipping  
Walmart  Transparency and traceability in 
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Researchers have found that data collected during a case study analysis such as this 
tends to be rich in detail (Silverman, 1993; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1989). Therefore, using 
multiple-case study method (Yin, 2003), we structured our search around identifying 
commonalities and differences. We recognized that our research sought out successful 
examples of blockchain technology applications in industry, but we didn’t know what 
trends would emerge. To avoid our reliance on memory throughout the research process, 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In this chapter, we present the facts and findings of our analysis using the methods 
listed in Chapter III. The purpose of our research was to determine whether blockchain 
technology could be applied to the DoD’s acquisition process to achieve a benefit. In the 
following sections of this chapter, we present trends in the data, commonalities, and 
differences that emerged over the course of our research. Importantly, we intentionally 
selected successful business cases as part of our method, and a different case selection may 
result in different findings.  
A. FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
While various GAO reports and other regulatory compliance agencies have 
raised numerous concerns regarding the DoD acquisition process, based on our structured 
literature review, we found three prominent characteristics underlying many issues in the 
DoD acquisition process. These include the lack of auditability, overly duplicative 
verification processes, and the lack of traceability and transparency at several steps 
in the process.   
1. Need for Auditability 
Significant deficiencies are evident in how the DoD accounts for the $639 billion 
allocated for defense spending in 2018 (DoDaro, 2017). The DoD does not have to comply 
with private-sector accounting standards such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which, 
among other things, holds senior leaders responsible for establishing and enforcing controls 
within a firm and requires them to certify the accuracy of financial reports. However, 
Congress has directed the DoD, on multiple occasions, to develop auditable records. Nearly 
30 years later, the DoD is still unable to produce a trail of transactions (Grassley, 2016). In 
1990, the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act was the first direction to create financial 
statements. Then in 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allotted seven 
years for the DoD to clean up its financial records. The agency failed to do so (DoDaro, 
2017).  
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After auditing the Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Report of the United States 
Government, Comptroller General of the United States, Mr. DoDaro (2017), concludes that 
significant concerns exist about the auditability of the federal government and the DoD 
specifically. In this report (GAO 17–283R), DoDaro states: 
independent public accountants (IPA) issued disclaimers of opinion for all 
three DoD components’ [Schedule of Budgetary Activity] SBA for both of 
these fiscal years [2015 and 2016] and identified material weaknesses in 
internal control at all three DoD components. These material weaknesses 
included the inability to reasonably assure that the SBAs reflected all of the 
relevant financial transactions that occurred and that documentation was 
available to support such transactions. (p. 3) 
GAO (2017a), a high-risk series report, states that the “DoD remains one of the few 
federal entities that cannot demonstrate its ability to accurately account for and reliably 
report its spending or assets” (p. 26). On the surface, auditability appears to be an 
accounting and finance issue. However, DoD funds flow through contracting officers, and 
since 1992, DoD Contract Management has also been cited in the GAO’s high-risk series 
report for its inefficiencies and need for substantial reform (GAO, 2017a). The GAO’s 
high-risk report highlights the need for increased visibility into the planned spending for 
contract services and greater alignment and collaboration on the highest spend categories 
(GAO, 2017a). Moreover, auditability and planned spending allow for analysis of 
opportunities within categories of spend.  
The DoD website announced the commencement of the first DoD-wide official 
audit in 2017. Defense Department Comptroller David Norquist stated, “It is important that 
the Congress and the American people have confidence in DoD’s management of every 
taxpayer dollar” (Garamone, 2017, para. 5). The scale and scope of such an audit is a 
massive undertaking. For the DoD alone, leaders project that approximately 1,200 auditors 
will be needed to complete the task. The audit announcement also reported that future 
audits would take place annually (Garamone, 2017).  
The total amount obligated in Fiscal Year 2017 on federal contracts by the DoD is 
greater than all other government agencies combined (Schwartz, Sargent, & Mann, 2018). 
As hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars are obligated each year, it is critical to ensure 
that contract funds are not being lost or spent improperly. This requires the government to 
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have strong controls that provide reasonable assurance of proper distribution of funds 
(GAO, 2011).  
The federal government must transform operations in an attempt to become more 
easily auditable, not only to comply with the direction of Congress but to carry out its duty 
as a good steward of taxpayers’ dollars. According to the Acquisition Encyclopedia 
(“Audits,” 2018), “Congress has a vital interest in seeing that taxpayer monies are spent in 
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and sound practices” (para. 2). Currently, the 
DoD enforces standards by conducting audits in two main areas: the acquisition process 
and a contract’s financials (“Audits,” 2018). Acquisition oversight audits focus on federal 
procurement and contract administration policies and regulation to analyze proper 
adherence to regulations. The contract audits analyze the financial and accounting elements 
of specific government contracts.   
The governing body for both types of audits is the GAO. According to the “About” 
section of the GAO (n.d.) website, “GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency of 
Congress” (para. 1). In a Congressional Research Service report, Gnanarajah (2017) 
explains the agency’s mission: “GAO’s mission is to support Congress in meeting its 
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the 
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of taxpayers” (p. 13). Additionally, 
the DoD Inspector General (IG) also assists in audits including the audit for the government 
purchase card (GPC) program.  
We spotlight the level of difficulty in auditing the GPC program. The GPC program 
provides federal agencies with a flexible and effective way of purchasing but also increases 
the need for audits to ensure compliance with decentralized spending. When not properly 
controlled, transactions by an authorized purchase cardholder can be a significant liability 
(GAO, 2008). Interestingly, according to the Government Charge Card Guidebook, if a 
purchase is made on a card and is later determined to be unauthorized, the government is 
still liable for the payment to the vendor (DoD, 2017). Furthermore, the government has 
limited centralized visibility into the specific items or categories of spending (GAO, 2016).  
The secretary of the Air Force inspector general (SAF/IGQ) released a Guide to 
Fraud, Waste, or Abuse Awareness (SAF/IGQ, 2014) that specifically pointed out the GPC 
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program as susceptible to the risk of card misuse (unintentional) and abuse (intentional). 
The guide draws awareness to the potential for collusion between GPC Approving Officials 
(AO) and cardholders to conduct unauthorized purchases as a specific example of abuse. 
Audits on the GPC program occur from the lowest level all the way to the DoD Inspector 
General (DoD IG) to identify and analyze risks of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases 
and payments, and the results are reported to the director of the OMB and Congress (DoD, 
2017, para. 2.2).  
The GPC program operates under guidance from the undersecretary of defense for 
acquisition, technology and logistics (USD[AT&L]) published in the DoD’s Government 
Charge Card Guidebook for Establishing and Managing Purchase, Travel, and Fuel Card 
Programs (DoD, 2017). The purpose of this guidance is to help DoD officials establish and 
implement charge card programs within their organizations. The guidance indicates many 
program outcomes but places specific emphasis on the following: “Management controls 
shall effectively identify, correct, and minimize charge card violations” (DoD, 2017, para. 
1.1).  
Furthermore, section 2.2.2, paragraphs (a) through (c), lists guidance that 
departmental programs should have the following controls to minimize losses—all 
annotated with a bold red “mandatory” heading (DoD, 2017): 
1. Reviews, at a minimum annually, of all managing/billing accounts and 
associated cards, to identify sources of charge card violations and assess 
compliance with governing regulations, policies, and procedures.  
2. Specific controls in place to ensure that losses due to charge card 
violations are minimized. The adequacy of the control environment shall be 
continuously assessed to ensure that controls are working as intended.  
These mandatory processes indicate that there is a need to review and verify many 
things within the GPC program to ensure the program can support a DoD-wide audit. 
Depending on the extent of the items that require manual verification, this has the 
opportunity to take an extensive amount of time. We understand that sometimes audits are 
law-driven. However, the law was developed to fix a problem and should be changed if 
such a problem can be fixed in another manner.  
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2. Duplicative Verification 
From requesting funding to ensuring contractor compliance, the acquisition process 
is riddled with inefficiencies. The proverb “trust but verify” is frequently used in the DoD 
and in U.S. business. Although the origins of this phrase trace back hundreds of years, 
President Ronald Regan brought it into American households during his term in the White 
House while dealing with Russia and discussing nuclear power (“Trust but Verify,” 1987). 
Research shows that supplier–buyer relationships improve in the presence of trust for 
different reasons. Enhanced relations lead to reduced transaction costs and more efficient 
business interactions (Gundlach & Cannon, 2010). Anderson and Weitz (1989), Ganesan 
(1994), and Morgan and Hunt (1994) attribute the improvement to the buyer’s confidence 
regarding the seller’s performance and the value added to the buyer by the good intentions 
of the seller. Likewise, some authors find that an increased amount of trust acts as a proxy 
in place of more formal controls (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gundlach, 1994; Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997).  
However, trust is not inherent and presents a variety of vulnerabilities. To mitigate 
the risk of trusting those with whom we do business, we often use verification strategies. 
Gundlach and Cannon (2010) categorize these strategies as monitoring, assurance, and 
corroboration. While the DoD performs actions in all three classifications during the 
acquisition process of various goods and services, monitoring, primarily in the form of 
formal supplier evaluation, is the most applicable to this conversation.  
Entire systems and agencies exist in the government to verify a contractor’s 
information and performance, and to determine the eligibility of a contractor to receive a 
contract award. While well-intentioned acquisition personnel and suppliers feel the day-to-
day pain of working in these systems, the System for Award Management (SAM), 
Contractor Performance Assessment System (CPARS), and the Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System (PIPRS) are three systems that track and manage a supplier’s 
performance and status as a vendor. Directed by regulation to use these web-based 
applications, contracting personnel and vendors must expend considerable effort to make 
the systems work, because they do not always work as intended. Similarly, sizeable 
organizations such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense 
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Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA), and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
exist to verify cost, price, and payment information and perform administrative actions 
related to ensuring compliance with contract terms.  
Systems and agencies perform redundant actions—duplicating verification efforts 
at every step—because they lack assurance that information has not changed from one step 
to the next; not duplicating these efforts poses too great a risk. For example, on a 
commodity contract for a commercial item using Simplified Acquisition Procedures in 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Parts 12 and 13, the contracting officer must verify 
that the contractor is registered in the System for Award Management (SAM) on two 
separate occasions, at a minimum, in accordance with FAR 4.11—System for Award 
Management and 9.4—Debarment, Suspension, and Ineligibility. In accordance with FAR 
4.1103(a)(1) and 9.405, the contracting officer shall verify SAM registration and review 
exclusions upon receipt of the offer (or early enough in the acquisition process so a 
potential contractor could obtain proper registration) and immediately prior to award.  
However, in reality, the contracting administrator will search SAM three times: 
during the market research phase to search for sources, upon receipt of an offer after 
solicitation, and when the award document draft is sent to the contracting officer. 
Additionally, the contracting officer will verify SAM twice more, once before approving 
the combined synopsis/solicitation to ensure sources identified in market research phase 
are eligible for award, and second, prior to releasing the award. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989), these issues relate to agency theory, whereby contractors and the government have 
asymmetrical information and competing objectives and will act in their own self-interest.    
Short of any system outages, verifying a contractor’s status in SAM only takes a 
few minutes. However, with multiple agencies writing hundreds of contracts each year, the 
amount of time spent verifying a checked box or single word compounds into a substantial 
amount of wasted personal hours annually. Moreover, the contractor also invests resources 
into maintaining the firm’s SAM registration. The costs to comply with the SAM 
requirement are passed onto the government. Additionally, the requirement may also 
reduce the supply base by increasing the perception of barriers to entry, which deter 
contractors from wanting to do business with the government. 
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One may argue that the cost of duplicating the verification process is necessary to 
mitigate the risk of awarding to an ineligible contractor who attempts to hide information 
from the government. Section 1.102 of the FAR states that one primary goal of the Federal 
Acquisition System is to maintain the public’s trust and fulfil public policy objectives. If 
contracting officers fail to verify a contractor’s information, they risk losing the public’s 
trust and awarding to ineligible contractors.   
3. Traceability and Transparency 
The DoD IG reports in the Summary Report of DoD Compliance with the Berry 
Amendment and the Buy American Act (DoD Inspector General [DoD IG], 2018) that upon 
inspection of 109 contracts requiring compliance with the Berry Amendment, 40 contracts 
failed to comply. Additionally, upon inspection of 171 contracts requiring compliance with 
the Buy American Act, 41 contracts failed to adhere to the requirements of the law. The 
summary report included findings from four separate audits occurring between 2014 and 
2017. The most common explanation for the noncompliance is attributed to unfamiliarity 
with the requirements of the laws. In the findings section, DoD IG (2018) stated, 
For 40 of the 109 contracts reviewed, DoD contracting personnel had 
limited assurance that items purchased on contracts complied with the Berry 
Amendment; did not notify the public of the lack of domestically-produced 
products; and committed potential Antideficiency Act violations by using 
appropriated funds to procure items not grown, reprocessed, reused, or 
reproduced in the United States. 
As a result, DoD contracting personnel had limited assurance that items 
purchased on contracts complied with the Buy American Act and 
committed potential Antideficiency Act violations by using appropriate 
funds to procure foreign-made items. (p. ii)  
In response to the audits and prior to the release of DoD IG (2018), the president 
signed Executive Order No. 13788 (2017), “Buy American and Hire American,” stating 
that every government agency shall “scrupulously monitor, enforce, and comply with Buy 
American Laws” (Executive Order No. 13788, 2017). The Executive Order (No. 13788, 
2017) also required agencies to include recommendations for strengthening compliance 
with the Buy American Act.  
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Evidence suggests that the DoD acquisition process needs a better way to ensure 
compliance. Audits are costly, but in this single case with a targeted scope, the IG found 
$214.2 million in contract spending that was awarded with potential Antideficiency Act 
violations (DoD IG, 2018). Even with multiple layers of verifications and reviews, between 
24 and 36 percent of contracts in the two samples failed to comply with required laws and 
regulations. These findings suggest that there is room for improvement. The 
recommendations from the IG report include reemphasizing the existing regulations and 
ensuring the electronic contract writing systems are including the appropriate provisions 
and clauses in solicitations and contracts (DoD IG, 2018), but further guidance may be 
forthcoming. 
In addition to the cumbersome process for simple contractor verification, before 
purchasing an item, the contracting officer must ensure it complies with various provisions 
in the solicitation. For example, many commodities require compliance with The Buy 
American Act to ensure items are purchased from certain countries as outlined by 41 U.S.C. 
§ 8302. Currently, a contract manager does this through correspondence with the vendor 
prior to award. The government official may require proof of origin from an invoice or 
sales documents; however, such documents are prone to manipulation or at least require 
time to obtain. Furthermore, the costs of providing such documentation likely reflect in the 
amount charged to the government. Differently, some contracting officers simply accept a 
signature on the contract formalizing acceptance of the terms and conditions, including 
compliance with the Buy American Act.  
Chapter I discusses the findings from the Summary Report of DoD Compliance with 
the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act (DoD IG, 2018). Some contracts fail to 
enforce compliance because the contracting officer is inexperienced. In this instance, the 
contract may not contain the appropriate clauses to hold the contractor liable for 
compliance with such laws. With a blockchain-based platform, the government could 
leverage the technology by coding appropriate provisions into smart contract applications 
that rely neither on the contractor’s manual verification of the asset nor on the awareness 
of the contracting officer. Moreover, the system can instantly trace the origin of an asset 
provided by the contractor in the response to the request for quote (RFQ) and execute the 
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contract only if it meets the specified “if-then” terms such as those prescribed by the Buy 
American Act.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
1. Big Four Accounting Organizations Blockchain Program  
Current technology platforms offer tremendous improvements to the auditing 
community compared with processes from even 20 years ago. However, as demonstrated 
by consistent news headlines, mistakes and fraud still occurs. Therefore, publicly traded 
companies are required to open their books to external auditors to meet the requirements 
of financial regulators. It is not unlikely that a single firm could hold an immense volume 
of transactions on their books that require auditing. As a result, auditors often pull samples 
of transactions to examine, leaving the chance of missing fraudulent actions at large.   
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), LLC; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; Ernst & Young; 
and KPMG are the world’s four largest accounting firms (Big 4 Accounting Firms, 2018). 
They have announced that they are joining a group of 20 banks in Taiwan to test a 
blockchain service for the purpose of auditing financial reports (Zhao, 2018). Zhao reports 
the blockchain trial will improve the process of obtaining and evaluating audit evidence by 
utilizing the technology to conduct external confirmations for this group of selected 
organizations publicly traded in Taiwan (Zhao, 2018). The developer of this particular 
blockchain platform, Taiwan’s Financial Information Service Company (FISC), expects 
the new technology to streamline and automate the confirmation process through a 
traceable and tamper-proof chain of data, reducing the confirmation time from about 15 
days to less one day (Zhao, 2018).     
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a non-profit 
corporation established by Congress in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
charged the auditors of publicly traded organizations to plan and perform the audits 
necessary to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud (PCAOB, n.d.). Prior to 
implementation of this blockchain trial, the process of assessing audit evidence to verify 
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the authenticity of public companies’ financial transactions was completed manually 
(EconoTimes, 2018).  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, leveraged blockchain technology with a validation 
solution that accommodates scalable transaction volume and provides real-time data using 
propriety framework to evaluate the current state of various blockchains (Panjwani, 2017). 
According to PwC, their "solution combines our patent-pending risk framework with our 
proprietary continuous auditing software. It is currently the only standard that exists for 
risks and controls in the blockchain space for private business blockchain processes" (PwC, 
2017b). Their “blockchain risk framework” is used to identify the risk factors against six 
different risk categories and 100+ risk sub-categories (PwC, 2017a). The Blockchain 
Validation Solution Software is configured using the information gained by this 
framework.  
The nodes within this blockchain software are set up as a “read-only” nodes to 
monitor and log all transactions as they occur. This allows continuous controls and testing 
of all transactions. PwC reports that their Blockchain Validation Solution gives 
stakeholders the confidence they need, due to consistent risk and validation services, to 
encourage innovation (PwC, 2017b).  
The Big Four auditing firms place great emphasis on the external confirmation 
procedures as they are a critical part of their auditing process. Kevin Feng, COO of 
Vechain, received feedback from PwC with concerns about public blockchains, versus 
private blockchain, like Ethereum, due to large enterprise clients being uneasy. The 
concerns highlighted by Vechain are associated with the lack of having a stable governance 
model and the lack of economic stability (Feng & Lu, 2018). The application of a 
decentralized blockchain provides the ability to bypass external confirmation, hence saving 
time and resources. In May 2016, Deloitte established their first blockchain lab in Dublin 
in an effort to successfully establish blockchain initiatives. These developments are 
expected to reshape auditing procedures to give blockchain a more crucial role in the future 
of auditing.  
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2. Maersk International Shipping Blockchain  
On May 8, 2018, there was a joint congressional hearing titled Leveraging 
Blockchain Technology to Improve Supply Chain Management and Combat Counterfeit 
Goods. Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Ralph Abraham (R-LA) and Research and 
Technology Subcommittee Chairwoman Barbra Comstock (R-VA) heard testimony from 
Michael White, head of global trade digitization at Maersk, about the inefficiencies in the 
shipping industry. He described the number of separate but mutually dependent players 
who collect and verify information using disjointed and aging systems. He stressed the fact 
that the shipping industry suffers from redundant paperwork and verification issues which 
delay shipments and widely increase costs (Leveraging Blockchain, 2018). 
Academics, industry and government have long recognized the presence of 
inefficiencies in supply chains. Evident by the emergence of lean production and 
manufacturing processes, reducing waste in the supply chain is necessary for businesses to 
survive in today’s global market: “Non-lean practicing companies face competition from 
foreign made goods—competition which can have significant impacts on their business 
and industry” (Barac, Milovanović, & Andjelković, 2010, p. 321). Maersk Line, part of 
Maersk Group, a worldwide integrated transport and logistics company and key player in 
a number of supply chains, understands the need to streamline processes and reduce waste. 
Furthermore, as a common node in many supply chains, lean practices at Maersk Line have 
the potential to increase the efficiency of supply chains of thousands of customers.  
In 2018, Maersk and IBM announced a joint venture aimed to digitize the entire 
shipping ecosystem using blockchain technology. Maersk, as a leader in container 
shipping, and IBM, as a major leader in the digital technology space and advancement of 
blockchain technology, have progressed the shipping environment through their use of a 
blockchain platform leveraging Hyperledger technologies, which are modular in nature and 
allow for plug-and-play applications (IBM, 2018). In 2016 and 2017, they successfully 
created a blockchain-based platform and conducted a pilot study to determine how 
effective the system was at reducing redundancies and costly paper-based tracking systems. 
In 2017, Maersk included the following statement in its Sustainability Report: 
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Together with IBM, we have created the first two applications for this 
platform, one called Paperless Trade and the other targeting the Shipping 
Information Pipeline. The first digitizes trade documentation using 
blockchain technology to securely submit, stamp and approve documents 
for clearance and cargo movement. The second gives complete visibility of 
shipment events through a supply chain. The aspiration is that these two 
applications are just the beginning, and that other players in the supply chain 
develop and offer new applications based on our shared data and 
technologies. (p. 10) 
Since the proof-of-concept project and announcement of the joint venture, other 
industry leaders have joined Maersk and IBM. In February 2018, Agility, a publicly traded 
logistics company with over $4 billion in annual revenue, announced its commitment to 
collaborate on the platform now known as TradeLens to manage and track shipping 
container operations (Port Technology, 2018). In April 2018, Holt, an independent 
domestic port operator in Philadelphia, announced its intentions to embark on a pilot study 
using the same platform (Marex, 2018). Additionally, various other domestic, 
international, private- and public-sector parties have commenced pilot runs leveraging the 
Maersk and IBM blockchain platform. 
In the interim financial report for the second quarter of 2018, A.P. Møller–Mærsk 
A/S, the parent company of Maersk Line, reported a 24% increase in revenue and 
individual segment growth in all segments as compared to the same time period last year 
(2018). Additionally, “terminal hubs port moves per hour performance improved by 8.6% 
compared to Q2 2017 driven by operational synergies and initiatives materializing” (A.P. 
Møller–Mærsk A/S, p. 15). With increasing revenue and improved throughput at the 
terminal hubs, one would reasonably expect Maersk to report favorable earnings for the 
period. However, A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S reported nearly a 4% decline in earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). The interim report attributes the 
decline in EBITDA to various causes across the conglomerate such as higher bunker costs 
(fuel) and negative impacts from foreign exchange rates. Specifically, the logistics and 
services segment of Maersk Line report “EBITDA decreased by 38% to USD 28m (USD 
46m), negatively impacted by higher IT costs including continued investments in new 
digital solutions and customer implementations and lower profitability in inland services” 
(A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S, p. 16). 
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A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S recognizes that budget outlays are required for technology 
upgrades. Published in the annual magazine for 2016/2017, Gokcen, chief digital officer, 
explained in an article that A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S is determined to lead the digital 
transformation in the shipping and logistics segment (Gokcen, 2017). Similarly, Bruus, 
head of Future Solutions, Fleet Management and Technology, Maersk Line, stated, “The 
short-term focus is to realise the efficiency benefits of more accurate, real-time data to 
optimise our operations. We expect that the impact of this data flow on our operational 
efficiency will be a significant positive” (Goken, p. 19).   
Maersk and IBM’s blockchain-based shipping platform TradeLens has grown to 
nearly 100 global trade participants and performed hundreds of millions of shipping events 
across 235 marine gateways around the world (Castillo, 2018). By using a private 
blockchain, Maersk and IBM are addressing the concerns of various partners about how 
data is seen and shared. However, private blockchains, by their very nature, negate some 
of the safeguards created by the decentralized operations of a public blockchain. 
Additionally, by developing a private blockchain platform, major competitors are likely to 
develop their own system instead of using TradeLens overseen and managed by Maersk 
and IBM. Maersk and IBM argue that using an open-source code for the key application 
programming interfaces of TradeLens provides space for evolutions of the platform to 
operate on various blockchains (King, 2018).  
3. Walmart Blockchain Pilot Program 
Frank Yiannas, vice president of Walmart’s Food Safety Department, believes that 
food transparency is imperative to guard against foodborne illnesses, prevent food fraud, 
and ensure regulatory compliance (Nuce, Yiannas, Pradhan, & Zabrocki, 2017). In 2016, 
IBM introduced Walmart to blockchain technology with a proposal to improve traceability 
and transparency within supply chain operations (Nuce et al., 2017). The proposed platform 
was built on the Hyperledger Fabric as a permissioned network and operates on IBM’s 
cloud services (Miller, 2018).  
As one expert states, “[t]ransparency of a supply chain is the degree of shared 
understanding of and access to product-related information as requested by a supply 
chain’s stakeholders without loss, noise, delay, or distortion” (as cited in Hofstedel, 
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Schepers, Spaans-Dijkstra, Trienekens, & Beulens, 2005). For this discussion, we define 
transparency in the supply chain as the extent to which stakeholders have access to higher-
level information under the main components as explained by Trienekens, Wognum, and 
van der Vorst (2012). These components include information about government and 
consumer actors, food companies, quality and safety standards, arrangements between 
supply chain participants and IT systems. Egels-Zandén, Hulthén, and Wulff (2015) and 
Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) explained how transparency is important to all stakeholders but 
especially important to external stakeholders who may otherwise lack access to such details 
in the supply chain as compared to internal customers.  
Doorey (2011) and Laudal (2010) define transparency as the ability to track a 
product as it flows through the system. However, in agreement with Dabbene, Gay, and 
Tortia (2014), we consider the ability to track a product from origin to end use through the 
supply chain a characteristic of traceability. Aung and Chang (2014) clarified that 
traceability includes access to the what, how, where, why, and when regarding an item in 
the supply chain.  
Today’s modern food supermarket is filled with tens of thousands of different 
options. The food system has changed drastically. In the 1980s, a typical grocery store had 
about 15,000 items (Nuce et al., 2017). Today, the options for consumers are almost endless 
regarding what consumers can purchase and where they can purchase it from. Abeyratne 
and Monfared (2016) expanded on this idea:  
There are billions of products being manufactured everyday globally, 
through complex supply chains that extend to all parts of the world. 
However, there is very little knowledge of how, when and where these 
products were originated, manufactured, and used through their life cycle. 
(p. 1)  
Nuce et al. (2017) described the lack of transparency as a huge risk in the food supply 
chain. The fact that there is not enough transparency in the food system is the main 
vulnerability of this type of supply chain. 
One of many examples of this is the E. coli outbreak from spinach in 2006. This 
outbreak caused 199 reported cases across 26 states that resulted in three deaths (Nuce et 
al., 2017). Early on, health officials said they believed it was associated with bagged 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 39 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
spinach. Authorities advised consumers to immediately stop eating the suspect spinach and 
stores removed it from their shelves. It took the health officials about two weeks to find 
the source of that spinach (Nuce et al., 2017). In the end, it was determined the spinach that 
caused the outbreak came from a single lot, a single supplier, on one particular day (Nuce 
et al., 2017). However, stores all over the country pulled all their spinach; which resulted 
in lost revenue and unhappy customers for several weeks.  
Today, consumers are expected to trust labeling on a product, such as it being 
organic or in compliance with another certification, without any way to determine whether 
the item complies. In many cases, the certification process depends on local factors such 
as in-country regulations and corrupt authorities (Elder, Zerriffi, & Le Billon, 2013). 
Walmart used the mango supply chain process, starting from the farm to consumer, 
for their pilot blockchain program for proof of concept to enhance its ability to track and 
trace (Nuce et al., 2017). The first thing they did was place a package of sliced mango on 
the table and asked their employees to search and find out where these exact mangos came 
from. It took the team six days, 18 hours, and 26 minutes (Nuce et al., 2017). To put this 
into perspective, Walmart is considered to be faster than most with traceability—which 
highlights the inefficiency.  
However, with use of Walmart’s blockchain platform, traceability for these sliced 
mangos was reduced from six days and 18 hours to 2.2 seconds, or the “speed of thought” 
as Walmart describes it (Nuce et al., 2017). Walmart can trace each step of a single package 
of sliced mangos from the farm to their shelves. Figure 7 is the image Walmart used to 
illustrate the flow of goods at each step. This information is maintained on the blockchain 
platform and accessible in real time. 
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 Walmart and IBM Provide Traceability in Supply Chain. 
Source: Galvin (2017). 
In the end, Walmart’s food supply chain was able to identify the source of 
potentially-contaminated mangos within 2.2 seconds, versus nearly seven days as was the 
case prior to the blockchain initiatives, and the overall benefits were overwhelming. 
Walmart continues to evolve this research by implementing a similar application in the 
pork industry in China. Not only does this system provide the potential to save lives, as in 
the E. coli example, but it can also reduce the amount of lost revenue by other market 
participants in the event of contamination. Furthermore, with blockchain, Walmart has the 
opportunity to increase confidence in today’s food supply network.   
Walmart’s pilot program improved traceability within the company’s supply chain. 
With blockchain solution, a retailer or consumer has the ability to see that a certain package 
of mangos came from two farms and can see the entire route of travel until the item reached 
the Walmart stores that sold this specific lot of mangos. Additionally, the blockchain 
solution showed the bottleneck of the process, which was the time it took to cross the 
border—four days. The platform also improves Walmart’s supply chain transparency. The 
new platform provides information to regarding compliance with the main concerns, such 
as sustainability practices and product safety standards., voiced by Trienekens et al. (2012).   
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Blockchain has the potential to shine a light on all nodes of a supply chain, which 
leads to increased accountability and greater levels of responsibility. In Nuce et al. (2017), 
Yiannas conveyed his belief that people typically self-govern and moderate their actions 
and behaviors when they are aware of transparency. Nuttavuthisit and Thøgersen (2015) 
stated, “Consumer trust is a key prerequisite for establishing a market for credence goods, 
such as ‘green’ products, especially when they are premium priced” (p. 1). In the face of 
business scandals and a general distrust of corporations, consumers are less willing to 
blindly rely on certifications for higher food standards (Choi, Eldomiaty & Kim, 2007). 
Therefore, transparency and traceability can provide much-needed support in the face of 
food fraud and consumer confidence. 
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V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, we discuss the findings of our analysis to uncover any common 
threads between the three cases. We do not generalize this discussion for the application to 
any larger population. Instead, we intend to apply the apparent lessons learned from 
industry cases to the DoD acquisition process by outlining specific use cases for blockchain 
technology as a solution for the main concerns of auditability, duplicative verification, and 
traceability and transparency. As one expert notes, “[a]s with any emerging technology, it 
can be difficult to separate promise from probability” (Catalini, 2017, para. 2). The DoD 
must be realistic about the potential benefits and current maturity of this technology while 
focusing on the actual business problems in the acquisition system.  
A. TRENDS 
Based on our case study analysis of the Big Four accounting firms, Maersk, and 
Walmart, all three organizations are major players in their respective markets and have 
significant influence on industry standards. It is likely that if smaller, uninfluential 
companies were to drive blockchain initiatives, the utilization of blockchain would be 
much different. Because of the interconnectedness required for successful blockchain 
applications, smaller firms cannot drive change in the same way that larger firms can. As 
industry leaders, these companies have power over their suppliers to encourage conformity 
with innovation efforts such as blockchain platforms. Likewise, because large firms have 
many suppliers, blockchain efforts quickly gain momentum as many dependent suppliers 
cultivate blockchain solutions.  
Although the subjects of the case studies are major market players in their 
respective industries, they all used joint ventures, partners, or consortiums. Each case had 
two distinct parties: a technology subject matter expert and an industry subject matter 
expert. Industry experts are familiar enough with blockchain technology to recognize its 
importance; still they lack the technical expertise to build a functional program. In the Big 
Four case study, the accounting firms had industry expertise, while FISC held the technical 
expertise. In the Walmart and Maersk cases, both relied on IBM for the technical expertise.  
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We are cautious to analyze trends in the use of a specific blockchain framework 
because both Walmart and Maersk used IBM, which has a preference for the Hyperledger 
Fabric framework. There are various blockchain frameworks to consider when developing 
enterprise solutions. Ethereum, for example, is widely used to support smart contract 
applications (Ethereum.org), while R3 Corda focuses on supporting the banking, financial 
services and insurance (r3.com). More research is required to analyze how an organization 
should select the specific framework and determine the appropriateness of a private versus 
public blockchain. Evidence suggest that companies currently favor private blockchains 
over public chains likely due to the uncertain nature of required computation power for 
operation, proper governance, and privacy of sensitive information (Jayachandran, 2017; 
Lannquist, 2018).  
A major milestone in all three cases was the launch of a proof of concept, or trial 
run, of the platform and associated processes. This was followed by a pilot study prior to 
company-wide system rollout. They used the proof of concept to determine system 
functionality and the pilot study to obtain real-world results from the solution. The pilot 
studies for Maersk and Walmart both lasted approximately one year. The Big Four case 
study revealed that the proof of concept for the auditing solution is active but not yet 
complete. Furthermore, they have not started the pilot study. The individual companies of 
the Big Four auditing firms are, however, actively developing internal blockchain projects 
for future implementation.  
Similar to technology advancements of the past, such as the internet and GPS, the 
DoD must recognize its unique vantage point in driving meaningful adoption of blockchain 
technology. Like the industry leaders of our research, the DoD can act as a conduit to funnel 
financial resources to the research and development of emerging technologies such as 
blockchain. Additionally, and similar to the companies in our case studies, the DoD is a 
major industry player. With relationships across a diverse network of suppliers, the DoD 
can influence widespread adoption of blockchain technology. 
We agree with experts that blockchain technology is here to stay (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). Industry is moving forward with or without the DoD, which can cause 
future challenges in our defense supply base if we are not able to achieve interoperability 
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with industry’s blockchain-based systems. The GAO cites several challenges that currently 
deter firms from working with the DoD, including long contracting timelines and complex 
processes (GAO, 2017b). Failing to stay relevant in the technology space would cause 
further frustrations among potential suppliers.  
B. BLOCKCHAIN AS A SOLUTION 
Blockchain technology enables the functionality of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin 
and Ethereum. Originating in 2008, blockchain was synonymous with Bitcoin and 
disregarded by much of the general public (Gupta, 2017). Since then, blockchain has 
emerged as a foundational technology with the potential to alter the way we conduct many 
of our current day-to-day interactions (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). Bolstered by discussions 
in the Pentagon and direction from Congress, the concept of blockchain in the government 
is quickly advancing.  
In the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section 1646 requires 
the secretary of defense to brief Congress on cyber applications of blockchain technology: 
SEC. 1646. BRIEFING ON CYBER APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN 
TECHNOLOGY.  
(a) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the heads of such other departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government as the Secretary considers appropriate, shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the cyber applications of 
blockchain technology.  
(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing under subsection (a) shall 
include—  
(1) a description of potential offensive and defensive cyber 
applications of blockchain technology and other distributed 
database technologies;  
(2) an assessment of efforts by foreign powers, extremist 
organizations, and criminal networks to utilize such technologies;  
(3) an assessment of the use or planned use of such 
technologies by the Federal Government and critical infrastructure 
networks; and  
(4) an assessment of the vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure networks to cyber attacks. 
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Blockchain is not a single solution to the complex process of DoD acquisitions. 
However, we contend that blockchain technology has the potential to improve or solve the 
main concerns listed above, thereby creating efficiencies. In fact, Congress agrees. The 
2018 Economic Report (Joint Economic Committee, 2018) says, “Government agencies at 
all levels should consider and examine new uses for this technology [blockchain] that could 
make the government more efficient” (p. 226). By transforming how the DoD conducts 
business, the government can realize significant benefits from this technology. 
Furthermore, as the technology advances, the United States federal government may not 
have the option to shy away from blockchain. Industry, allies, and enemies are devoting 
extraordinary resources to expand their blockchain competencies (Morris et al., 2018).  
Private-industry companies are testing the advantages of blockchain and offer an 
opportunity for the DoD to learn from established practices. We explored this concept 
using a case study evaluation approach and inspected relevant cases, which exemplified 
industry’s successful implementation of blockchain technology to solve issues similar to 
those of the government acquisition process. Parallels exist where the DoD can apply 
similar practices to achieve efficiencies.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations join the main concerns within the DoD 
acquisitions process, auditability, duplicative verification, traceability and transparency, 
with blockchain solutions. Our recommendations are based on finding a solution to known 
business problems. We embarked on this research with the understanding that the selected 
cases solved concerns similar to the ones we identified using blockchain technology. 
However, it is vital to recognize that an exact parallel may not be the ideal solution to 
remedy government or DoD specific business problems. 
1. Develop Necessary Organic Capabilities 
The DoD should recognize the significance of developing organic capabilities 
within the rapidly changing blockchain technology space. Tapscott and Tapscott (2017) 
recommends that leaders find this talent within the walls of the organization. At 
a minimum, the DoD needs to know enough to effectively manage contracts for  
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blockchain systems. In the era of contracting out for the majority of products and services, 
the DoD requires the internal capacity to properly manage any future requirement 
related to blockchain. Accordingly, “[g]iven the tendency to greater outsourcing and 
increased organizational specialization in the private sector, we expect to see those 
tendencies reflected in government management now and in the future” (Cohen & Eimicke, 
2008, p. 15).  
Evidenced by the case studies with both Maersk and Walmart, industry leaders have 
utilized the expertise of IBM to develop their blockchain platforms.  Developing the 
competency that IBM currently holds would take time and resources that are not best spent 
allocated to these efforts. Similarly, it is in the best interest of the DoD to outsource. It is 
important to note, based on the law of supply and demand, when demand is high and supply 
is low, prices increase, and the DoD should prepare to pay a premium for blockchain 
engineers.  
Due to the nature of blockchain based platforms, computer-centric functional areas 
are the appropriate lead to drive this effort. It is not necessary that every installation hold 
blockchain experts. Instead, using the hub concept as a model, our recommendation is to 
create centralized hubs to manage blockchain projects with multi-functional integrated 
project teams. As blockchain technology is woven into the fabric of our business processes, 
base level communication personnel should hold a basic understanding of the technology.   
This could be included in entry level technical training.    
The first step is to develop a working group targeted at a specific business case such 
as the government purchase card program.  It is critical for the working group to identify 
key members of the multi-functional integrated project team, such as computer engineers, 
program managers, contracting, and legal. This working group should be co-located and 
solely assigned to the development of this solution.  This collaborative team will clarify 
the goals of the platform, develop key focus areas, and determine the way forward.  
Currently, there is an increased demand and a shortage of supply for blockchain 
talent. According to the PwC Global Blockchain Survey (2018), 84% of 600 executives 
interviewed reported that their organization have at least some involvement with 
blockchain technology (PwC, 2018). Similarly, Deloitte surveyed more than 1000 
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executives to determine where blockchain is headed. They found “74 percent of all 
respondents report that their organizations see a ‘compelling business case’ for the use of 
blockchain—and many of these companies are moving forward with the technology” 
(Deloitte, 2018, para. 3). With this increased demand, organizations are challenged by a 
shortage of blockchain talent (Deloitte, 2018; Marr, 2018; Upwork, 2018).   
2. Government Purchase Card Pilot 
A significant issue with the GPC program is that audits are necessary, costly and 
incomplete, which has the ability to cause powerful consequences. PwC leveraged 
blockchain technology with a validation solution that accommodates scalable transaction 
volume (Panjwani, 2017).  Therefore, based on the trends found in our case study analysis, 
we recommend partnering with the issuing bank of the GPC and blockchain experts such 
as IBM or Deloitte, to develop a blockchain system for transaction processing. In addition, 
we recommend developing a proof of concept to determine the feasibility of the system.  
On multiple occasions, Congress has directed the DoD to develop auditable records. 
The DoD is still struggling to produce a trail of transactions nearly 30 years later (Grassley, 
2016). The GPC program provides federal agencies with a flexible and effective way of 
purchasing but also increases the need for audits to ensure compliance with decentralized 
spending. When analyzing the expected benefits found within the blockchain-based 
validation solution tool developed by PwC, many benefits can easily be relatable.  Similar 
to PwC, the DoD can improve the auditing sector with the GPC program through 
streamlining and automating the confirmation process through a traceable and tamper-
proof chain of data, reducing the confirmation time significantly (Zhao, 2018).       
With a partnership between service-level leads within the communication and 
acquisition communities, the first step would be to create a process map that would aid in 
identifying the most significant issues to be addressed. Barring any major concerns from 
the process map, the next step would be to proceed with a pilot program with a limited 
number of users to obtain real-world data. 
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3. Procurement and Supply Chain System  
The DoD labors to comply with the various laws and regulations that govern the 
federal acquisition process, such as the Buy American Act. This act, outlined by 41 U.S.C. 
§ 8302, ensures items are purchased from certain countries. Currently, a contract manager 
uses various avenues to validate this requirement. For example, the vendor may provide 
proof of origin by providing an invoice or sales documents; however, such documents are 
prone to manipulation or at least require time to obtain. Differently, some contracting 
officers simply accept a signature on the contract formalizing acceptance of the terms and 
conditions, including compliance with the Buy American Act. 
We recommend that these challenges, among others, be addressed through the 
creation of a blockchain-based procurement and supply chain system. This system can be 
look similar to the unique systems employed by Walmart and Maersk. Maersk successfully 
launched a blockchain-based platform and conducted a pilot study to determine how 
effective the system was at reducing redundancies and costly paper-based tracking systems 
(IBM, 2018).  Walmart's blockchain system proved successful when their mango supply 
chain using a blockchain program improved traceability from 6 days to 2.2 seconds (Nuce 
et al., 2017). 
Through a multifunctional system, DoD logistics and acquisitions can utilize tools 
developed to be interoperable and compatible from a single platform.   We recommend this 
single system be created to complete many functions leveraging blockchain, such as smart 
contracts to automate compliance with various regulations and asset tracking associated 
with supply chain management. In efforts to address the duplicative verification of various 
isolated systems, such as SAM, we recommend interoperability with the ability to verify 
contractor responsibility.   
Given the trends from our research, we recommend a partnership, preferably with 
an established blockchain expert such as IBM, to develop this integrated system through 
guidance from service-level logistics and acquisitions personnel. Using other transaction 
authority (OTA), the DoD can make an initial first step by contracting for a proof of 
concept project.  
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The firms we studied used a private blockchain because they experienced concerns 
with computational power requirements, proper governance, and privacy of sensitive 
information. For these reasons, we recommend operating a procurement and supply chain 
system on a private blockchain initially. Importantly, the application program interfaces 
should be modular in nature to allow a plug and play method in the face of the changing 
blockchain environment.   
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. LIMITATIONS 
We are not generalizing any of our findings because supply chains differ and would 
benefit from a targeted analysis. Because of time constraints and access to resources, we 
investigated only three cases to analyze any common threads or patterns. Our case selection 
was intentional so that we could study organizations that used blockchain to solve problems 
similar to those of the acquisition process within DoD. With limited time and resources, 
we recognize that there are various elements to each case, which could affect the outcome 
of future studies. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH  
The next step is to encourage a research team to consider the actual development 
of a blockchain platform geared towards solving a specific business problem to gain a 
better understanding of the technical workings of such a system. The recommendations 
presented in chapter five are based on the trends from our business case analysis. Because 
of these trends, the development of a platform would benefit from a partnership involving 
an expert from the business case and an expert in blockchain development 
C. CONCLUSION 
There are varying opinions on the degree on which blockchain will transform the 
current state of business interactions. While some industry players believe it will affect a 
wide variety of specialties such as healthcare and insurance (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016), 
others see a more targeted application limited to banking and supply chain. It is important 
to differentiate when applying the key aspects of blockchain are excessive and when they 
can add value to a business process. Conversationally, presenting blockchain as a solution 
to everything erodes its legitimacy as a transformational technology.  
After conducting a structured literature review, we elected to address the concerns 
of auditability, duplicative verification, and transparency and traceability in the DoD 
acquisition process. Simultaneously, we discovered emergent key aspects of blockchain 
technology. Using a case study method, we uncovered trends between three selected 
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business cases who are major industry players in their respective markets. While we did 
not use a statistically representative sample of the population, we intentionally selected 
cases to analyze their use of blockchain to remedy similar business problems.  
Our analysis suggests that opportunities exist to apply blockchain technology to the 
concerns identified in the DoD procurement realm. One of our goals from our research was 
to further move the discussion along with blockchain technology and discuss the potential 
it brings to the DoD. We present specific recommendations in Chapter V based on the 
analysis of data collected. As a whole, this research represents an initial step toward the 
continued exploration of how blockchain can improve the DoD acquisition process.  
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APPENDIX.  CONFERENCE AGENDA 
3RD ANNUAL BLOCKCHAIN CONFERENCE: WASHINGTON D.C. 2018 
 
8:00am - 9:10am – Coffee, Registration and Networking 
 
 
9:10am - 9:35am – Panel 1: Blockchain Trends – 2018 & 
Beyond 
 
MODERATOR – Wendy Henry, Specialist Leader – Federal 
Blockchain Lead, Deloitte Consulting, LLP 
Theodora Lau, Founder, Unconventional Ventures 
Tom Plunkett, Consulting Solutions Director, Oracle 
Yannis Kalfoglou, AI and Blockchain Advisor 




9:35am - 10:20am – Company Intros 1 
 
Calvin Wiese, CEO, Kalibrate Blockchain, Inc. 
Ryan Derks, Owner, Ryans Hodl Fund 
Garlam Won, Head of Global Partnership, ICONIZ – ICONIZ 
is an international crypto VC/Incubator based in Beijing and 
LA 
Charles Finfrock, CEO, Crypto Charles LLC 
 
 
10:25am - 10:50am – Panel 2: ICOs: The Good, The Bad & 
The Dangerous 
 
Adil Wali, Founder and CEO, Merit Labs 
John Wise, CEO, Loci Inc. 
David Drake, Managing Partner, The Soho Loft 
 
10:50am - 11:10am – Nikola Tesla Unite 
 
Dean Jessop, Founding Director at Nikola Tesla United Ltd, Nikola 
Tesla Unite Ltd 
Steve Dryall, Founding Director, Nikola Tesla Unite 
 
 
11:10am - 11:25am – EverID 
 
Bob Reid, CEO, EverID 
 
11:30am - 11:40am – Company Intros 2 
 
Deepak Tyagi, Founder, Artischain 
 
11:40am - 12:00pm – FinTech Worldwide 
 
Luis Carranza, Founder & CEO, Fintech Worldwide Ltd 
 
12:00pm - 12:30pm – Panel 3: Regulation Update 
 
MODERATOR – Jeff Truit, Chief Corporate Development and Legal 
Officer, Securrency, Inc. 
Brandon Hudgeons, COO, General Counsel, Unchained Capital 
Carol Van Cleef, CEO, Luminous Group, LLC 
 
 
12:35pm - 1:30pm - LUNCH BREAK 
 
 
1:35pm - 1:45pm – Brief Announcement 
 
 
1:50pm - 2:10pm – Company Intros 3 
 
Popo Chen, Founder, DEXON Foundation 
 
 
2:15pm - 2:40pm – Panel 4: Blockchain & Government  
 
MODERATOR – Darryn Jones, Director, Business Development, 
Grater Phoenix Economic Council 
Chelsea Parker, Director of Operations, Blockchain Alliance 
Adam Healy, CISO, Digital Asset Custody Company (DACC) 
Joel Braithwaite, Partner, Cogent Law Group 
 
 
2:45pm - 3:15pm – Company Intros 4 
 
Orion Agarwal, Capital Markets Advisor, CriptoHub 
Blake Richardson, CEO & Co-founder, CryptoPets 
Ross Krasner, Co-founder and CEO, Ryu Blockchain Technologies 
 
 




Bo Polny, CEO, Gold 2020 Forecast 
 
 
3:30pm - 4:00pm – Panel 5: Intellectual Property 
 
David Holt, Principal, Fish & Richardson 
Ryan Quick, Principal and Co-founder, Providentia Worldwide 
Monica Talley, Director, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox 
Richard Bemben, Associate, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox 
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9:00am - 9:25am – Panel 1: Investor Panel 
 
MODERATOR – Brett Noyes, MBA, Managing Partner, 
Unbank.Ventures 
Xiaochen Zhang, President, FinTech4Good 
Alex Gostomelsky Managing Partner, Switchboard 
Ventures 
Marshall Greenwald, CEO, Cray Pay 
Reggie Middleton, CEO, Veritaseum 
 
  
9:30am - 10:00am – Company Intros 1 
 
Robert Salvador, Co-Founder & CEO, DigiBuild 
 
 
10:00am - 10:15am – Security Tokens 
 




10:15am - 10:40am – Break 
 
 
10:40am - 10:55am – Nikola Tesla Unite 
 
Dean Jessop, Founding Director, Nikola Tesla Unite Ltd 
Steve Dryall, Founding Director, Nikola Tesla Unite 
 
 
11:00am - 11:45am – Ledger Cast 
 
Brian Krogsgard, Owner, Under Vulcan, LLC 
Josh Olszewicz, Trader, Techemy Capital Ltd 
 
 
11:45am - 12:30pm – Company Intros 2 
 
Ricky Ng, Co-Founder, iClick Interactive Asia Limited 
Ray Zhang, CEO, Cointime.com 
 




1:30pm - 1:55pm – Unbank.Ventures 
 




2:00pm - 2:45pm – Company Intros 3 
 
Panisa Srithong, Chief Growth Officer, BullPay 
Ryan Berkun, CEO, CoinPlan 
 
 




3:15pm - 3:35pm – STEMchain  
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